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A B S T R A C T
This study evaluates discontinuity induced by the two-stage
law-making process of EU directives, which is discussed in
the jurisprudential literature as another source of democratic
deficit. Directives must be transposed into national law, but
lengthy deadlines raise normative questions about the
extent to which governments of today can politically and
reliably commit domestic majorities of tomorrow. The
potential for discontinuity is analysed using transposition
data in 15 member states and preference indicators over the
last 20 years. The findings reveal that parliaments are largely
excluded from this process and that the preferences of the
previous and the newly elected representatives often differ
considerably, particularly in countries where public support
for European integration has declined in recent years.
4 1 1
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507079548
Volume 8 (3): 411–432
Copyright© 2007
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi 
and Singapore
K E Y  W O R D S
 democratic deficit
 discontinuity
 EU legislative studies
Discontinuity in two-stage EU law-making
This article investigates a constitutional element of democratic government,
namely the temporal restriction of political authority and power, which has
been disregarded in the political science literature on the EU’s democratic
deficit (see, for this debate, e.g. Dehousse, 1995; Majone, 1998, 2000;
Moravcsik, 2002; Follesdal and Hix, 2005; Rittberger, 2005). Much of this
literature focuses on the distribution of power in EU legislative decision-
making, in particular on whether the European Parliament (EP) is involved
or not, but it remains an open question whether and to what extent repre-
sentatives of today can commit the representatives of tomorrow, who can
hardly block, change or amend the decisions of previous representatives
(Pernice, 2005). In contrast to the provisions in the member states, in which
the authority and the policy-making activities of elected representatives
usually end with dissolution, or the ending of parliamentary sessions or the
conclusion of the legislative term, and in which pending initiatives usually
die in order to prevent discontinuity between the mandate and policy-making
(for more details, see Döring, 1995: 242), Commission proposals do not die,
nor does EU law-making allow for the direct control of representatives in a
temporally limited fashion. In particular, the implementation of directives
induces a potential for discontinuity by conventionally establishing a two-
year transposition period, in which newly elected representatives may be
obliged to implement decisions of the previous government without having
a realistic chance of amendment or revision in a timely fashion.1
From a normative perspective, discontinuity poses a legitimacy problem,
particularly in systems with strong checks and balances. It also threatens high
agency loss when the principal – the directly elected parliamentary represen-
tatives of voters – lacks control over the governmental agents and is unable
to learn about their preferences. However, a positive evaluation of the empiri-
cal impact of discontinuity first requires identification of the extent to which:
(i) governments of today can politically and reliably commit majorities of
tomorrow,
(ii) previous and current representatives differ in their preferences, and
(iii) these new majorities are able to learn about the implementation process.
Hence, the following analysis of discontinuity may point to another possible
source of the democratic deficit in the EU. Discontinuity is directly related to
the discussion about the involvement of the EP because, although moral
hazard and adverse selection problems usually give the (parliamentary)
principal incentives to gather information about the (governmental) agent
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(Lupia, 2003: 4), such learning is seriously restricted in the two-stage process
of EU law-making. In this two-stage process, the EP is still not completely
involved, and ‘governmental’ agents can increase their discretionary power
by hiding their preferences in secret Council negotiations as well as bypass-
ing their parliaments when they implement legislative decisions (König et al.,
2005). This suggests that discontinuity allows for power to expand over time,
and neither the parliamentary majority nor the voter can find out whether
and how the government was unwilling or unable to support the preferences
of the principal.
The following analysis will provide empirical insight into the potential
for discontinuity in the two-stage decision-making process of EU directives.
The major empirical challenges are to find out whether and to what extent
the parliamentary principal can learn ex ante and ex post about the govern-
mental agent’s behaviour, and to identify discontinuity problems by changing
coalitions and preferences during the implementation process in all member
states. For this purpose, longitudinal information is used on the transposition
history of all directives in 15 member states and on governmental preferences
from January 1986 to February 2003 (the entry into force of the Nice Treaty).
In addition to information on Commission proposals and EP participation,
the database includes 1569 directives and their transposition records in the
member states.2 This sample of more than 8000 observations will provide a
solid empirical answer to two questions on the amount and extent of
(i) domestic parliamentary inclusion in EU law-making by directives, and
(ii) discontinuity with respect to member state elections as well as changes
in government and coalition preferences.
The analysis attempts to answer whether and to what extent EU law-making
suffers from a parliamentary deficit at the EU and domestic level, and whether
and to what extent the EU requires the implementation of directives adopted
by a previous government, possibly by another coalition with quite different
preferences. In addition to the potential for change via elections, the analysis
also specifies whether and how often governmental composition changed in
the period between the adoption of the directive and notification of national
transposition measures as reported by the member states. However, since
governmental composition can change despite preferences remaining the
same, and, conversely, governmental composition can remain stable despite
changes in preferences, this study proposes the use of party manifestos to
identify sector-specific and EU-related governmental (coalition) preferences.
The study then introduces the problem of discontinuity and discusses the
lack of direct control of governmental agents, while also providing insight
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into parliamentary involvement in the law-making of directives. Furthermore,
the conventional domestic rules established to prevent discontinuity are
included as a web appendix for the 15 member states,3 revealing a large
discrepancy between domestic and EU provisions. Finally, discontinuity is
empirically examined with respect to electoral events, governmental coalition
and preference changes. The findings show that the two-stage process
associated with directives not only curtails ex ante and ex post parliamentary
control but also establishes a notable potential for discontinuity. In the period
between the adoption of a directive and the specified transposition deadline,
elections and governmental change are found in about one-third of all cases.
More importantly, governmental preferences change within the course of
most national transposition processes, even though these changes primarily
refer to sector-specific policy-making. In some countries, such as Austria,
Sweden and France, we find notable preference changes between the govern-
ment that agreed to Community legislation and the one responsible for imple-
menting it, suggesting a high potential for discontinuity problems.
Democracy and discontinuity – A comparative view on
temporal power
The continuity of representative democracy requires the temporal specifi-
cation of authority and power. In contrast to inheritance, which ties the hands
of newly elected governments with existing legislation and previously
adopted programmes (Rose and Davies, 1994), this temporal specification is
designed to avoid discontinuity in a formal and material sense as well as
among personnel (Pernice, 2005). In almost all democracies, discontinuity in
personnel is conventionally prohibited by displacing the president and the
dissolution of parliament, which usually includes all activities and parlia-
mentary committees. Material discontinuity concerns legislative decision-
making and is usually avoided by settling initiatives at the end of the term,
except for those cases not requiring formal adoption (Döring, 1995). In some
countries, such as the United Kingdom, this kind of parliamentary supremacy
is more of a ‘gentlemen’s agreement with constitutional character’, whereas
in countries such as Germany scholars interpret this practice as common law.
These provisions attempt to guarantee the temporal aspect of democracy and
are, thus, a fundamental constitutional element of representative democracy
in the member states of the EU.
In particular, in the normative jurisprudential literature, the central
assertion is that discontinuity threatens to violate this principle (Pernice,
2005). The most important facet of discontinuity concerns legislative
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decision-making, which sometimes involves institutions and legislative
bodies with permanent representation, such as the Austrian and German
Bundesrat as well as the Council of Ministers. These bodies often represent
(part of) the regional constituents of the political system, even though their
delegates may change and are sometimes replaced after elections. However,
owing to their permanent representative function, initiatives made within
these bodies are not necessarily settled at the end of the legislative term, either
in the German or in the EU case. Other examples of possible discontinuity
exist in only two EU countries, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. According
to Grey (1982), bills die at the end of the legislative term or with parliamentary
dissolution in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Portugal (every four years), as well as in France (every five years). In three
of these countries (France, Ireland and Portugal), a provision exists for
carrying a bill over after dissolution or expired legislative period. In Denmark
and the United Kingdom, where parliamentary sittings are divided into
sessions ranging from six months to a year, bills die at the end of the session
or with dissolution. Sweden has a unique provision leading to the expiry of
bills if they are not decided upon within one year of their introduction.
The web appendix supplements and specifies the information provided
in Grey’s (1982) survey. With the exception of Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands, time limits are generally imposed on the passage of bills, and these are
usually restricted to the current legislative term or session. In Denmark, the
United Kingdom and Sweden, bills die at the end of session. Belgium,
Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Austria and Portugal usually limit
legislative activities at the end of the legislative period or dissolution. In
Germany and Austria, dissolution and continuity apply only to the
Bundestag. In France, the Senate can still adopt a proposal from the dissolved
national assembly under closed rule, whereas governmental and parlia-
mentary bills usually expire with a change of government (Schorn, 2000:
43–54). Belgian bills can survive dissolution or the end of the legislative
period if they have already found approval in one of the Houses.
Although these formal hurdles exist for national legislation to prevent
discontinuity, the EU has established a two-stage law-making process that
allows for the exclusion of parliaments and the shifting of political account-
ability over time. The most common example of this two-stage process in the
EU is the transposition of directives, which defines binding and enforceable
guidelines for policy-making that have to be implemented by the national
legislator within a given period (König and Luetgert, 2005). From a political
science view, the conventional two-year transposition period of EU directives
– which may be extended to several years in the event of successive treaty
violation procedures or successful member state petition to extend the official
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deadline – risks a Jack-in-the-Box effect. Although there are several reasons
for continued transposition delay, including political, economic or adminis-
trative restrictions, the possibility of governmental and/or preference change
begs the question of how much this obligation matters for the newly elected
government.
In principle, such requirements do not necessarily threaten the legitimacy
of a political system, because the newly elected government can usually revise
or amend the previous government’s decision. However, compared to a few
member states where discontinuity problems may also arise, the EU has
established a restrictive voting system that makes revisions and amendments
by the newly elected government almost impossible. This system requires not
only that the Commission submits an initiative in the interests of the newly
elected representative, but also that the Council adopts the proposal by either
unanimity or a qualified majority of about 72% of Council votes in an enlarged
EU, sometimes followed by the necessary support of the EP. This increases the
potential of a Jack-in-the-Box effect, which threatens to dilute democratic
accountability and legitimization for political decisions, because parliament
and voters are unable to control the policy-making of their delegated repre-
sentatives with their electoral vote. Even if the results of the directive are not
supported by the current majority, both the government and (sometimes) the
parliament are obligated to adopt the measures appropriate for implementing
the directive and are hardly able to initiate amendments or to change this policy.
Compared with the political and scholarly debate on the EU’s democratic
deficit, which has drawn attention to the powers of the EP, few insights and
– to my knowledge – no empirical study exist on the discontinuity potential
induced by the two-stage process of EU directives. Some might argue that the
increasing participation of the EP is sufficient guarantee of the direct link
between principal and agent in EU law-making. Figure 1 shows the number
of binding legislative cases (regulations, directives and decisions) together
with EP involvement from the mid-1980s to the coming into force of the Nice
Treaty in 2003 (König et al., 2006). A quick inspection seems to confirm Hix’s
(2005) finding of a significantly higher inclusion of the EP. However, the
absolute number of cases involving EP participation has hardly increased in
recent years. The rate of parliamentary participation is increasing only
because the number of regulations and decisions has drastically decreased
since the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, whereas the number of directives has
remained constant over time.
These findings on the relatively low participation rate of the EP and the
higher relative importance of directives raise doubts about the EP’s ability to
guarantee accountability, and draw attention to the second stage of EU law-
making, where national parliaments can be involved in the implementation
process. To reduce agency loss and to identify the discontinuity potential, the
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question is to what extent this implementation process includes national
parliaments, particularly when the coalition and/or the preferences of the
majority have changed. Put differently, if a parliamentary majority of
tomorrow could control and revise the decisions of today’s governments,
discontinuity should pose no problem for the legitimacy of law-making; if
parliaments are able to learn about this process, discontinuity should pose a
minor problem because parliaments could make attempts to develop a
counter-strategy. However, if parliaments lack control and even information
about this process owing to their exclusion from policy-making, the question
is to what extent this process forces a member state to implement decisions
when the coalition and/or the preferences of the majority have changed.
When the majority neither knows what its governmental agent has promoted,
nor is informed about the implementation of the previous agent’s decision,
discontinuity will increase agency loss and raise a serious legitimacy problem
induced by the (growing) importance of directives.
Discontinuity without parliamentary control
The two-stage process of directives formally offers national parliaments ex
ante and ex post influence when the legislation is adopted at the EU level and
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Figure 1 Participation of the EP in EU legislation passed between 1984 and 2002.
Notes: These data refer to the 8475 decisions (D), directives (L) and regulations (R) proposed by
the Commission and documented in König et al. (2006). The applied legislative procedure is
documented in PreLex. 
when it is implemented at the national level. However, although criticism of
the EU’s legitimacy centres around the parliamentary deficit, and although
the Amsterdam Treaty declares that domestic parliaments have an important
role in legitimizing the positions of governmental representatives in the
Council, a number of studies suggest that the member states vary little in the
modest extent to which they allow parliaments to participate in the prep-
aration of their governmental position on Commission proposals. In a recent
study on domestic preference formation on Commission proposals, Baltz et
al. (2005) find that only the ‘Scandinavian’ model offers parliaments some
access to this ex ante coordination process, whereas other countries rarely
include their parliaments and prefer to coordinate their national position on
Commission proposals among their ministries. Similarly, König and Finke
(2005) demonstrate for the EU constitution-building process that this
executive model also dominates national position formation for the prep-
aration of constitutional policies.
This suggests that the member states themselves made a significant contri-
bution to the parliamentary deficit in EU legislative decision-making. The
governments of the member states have considerable discretion in deciding
about the ex ante inclusion of their own parliament, but most parliaments are
excluded from this process and receive little information about EU legislative
decision-making, which induces – in the terminology of the principal–agent
literature – problems of moral hazard (Lupia, 1992). Accordingly, the national
parliaments, as directly elected representatives and principals, regularly lack
information about the governmental agent’s action, thus allowing the agent
to choose her/his own views, including the possibility of adverse selection
owing to the secret nature of Council negotiations (Brehm and Gates, 1997).
As a result, parliamentary ex ante control and influence on the making of
directives are very limited, whereas governments have significant dis-
cretionary power in the relevant EU negotiations.
A second possibility for parliamentary involvement in EU legislative
decision-making may exist ex post during the implementation stage of
directives, which could offer the opportunity to learn about agent actions
from others. Whereas parliamentarians are directly elected, are more politi-
cally concerned about voters’ interests and will amend legislation accordingly,
the executive prefers usually to focus on the technical problems of policy-
making. For Majone, the EU is a regulatory agency addressing market
failures, which by definition produces Pareto-efficient outcomes and lacks not
democratic foundation but credibility (Majone, 1993, 2000). However, since
this agency will implement prior (Pareto-efficient) legislation even in the
event of major preference change, the exclusion of parliamentary involvement
should increase the risks of discontinuity. The exclusion of ‘regulatory’
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directives is particularly problematic in terms of potential discontinuity: these
directives are adopted by either the Commission, the Council, or the Council
and the EP and require transposition into the domestic law of member states,
which is formally monitored by the Commission. According to Article 249, a
directive is binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each member state
to which it is addressed, but leaves the choice of transposition instrument to
the national authorities. If the Commission decides that a member state has
failed to fulfil an obligation, it delivers a reasoned opinion on the matter after
giving that state the opportunity to submit its observations. If the state 
does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the
Commission, the Commission may bring the matter before the European
Court of Justice (Article 226), and significant sanctions can be imposed,
according to Article 228, in the event of further violation.
Member states typically have to notify the implementing measures
intended to achieve the results of the directive within a two-year period, even
if it contradicts national law. Formally, member states cannot justify delay by
domestic problems or restrictions because the supremacy of EU legislation
and the obligation to implement directives dominate any national provision,
even if this provision is a constitutional element (Prechal, 1995). This means
that the implementation of directives does not require any additional ratifi-
cation procedure and forces domestic legislative bodies to act in the interest
of the directive’s results. Not only are delay and ineffective implementation
punishable by monetary sanctions or provisions for liability, but the principle
of direct applicability also obliges national courts to rule in conformity with
the directive. Yet member states differ in their implementation record, and
the Commission does not prosecute all infringements (König, 2005; König 
et al., 2005). Table 1 lists the number of adopted directives and the notification
record of each member state.
Based on the Celex Sector 7 database, Table 1 lists in detail how many
directives applied to each member state, whether these member states reported
a transposition measure or not, the number of pending directives at the time
of data collection, the number of directives with a missing transposition
deadline, as well as the number of measures lacking a machine-readable date
of transposition despite member state notification. Between 730  and 1600
directives in total required transposition (resulting in 21,387 country*directive
observations), and between 454 (Austria) and 1229 (Portugal) directives
document transposition with at least one measure. At the time of data col-
lection, 18 directives were still pending, and member states failed to indicate
a national transposition deadline for between 57 and 193 directives. Between
12 and 155 cases had no adoption date for reported measures, and for between
63 and 279 cases we lack reported data on the transposition measure despite
König Discontinuity 4 1 9
European Union Politics 8(3)4 2 0
Ta
b
le
 1
E
U
 m
em
b
er
 s
ta
te
s’
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 t
o
 E
U
 d
ir
ec
ti
ve
s,
 1
98
6–
20
02
N
o 
ad
op
tio
n 
N
on
-
M
ea
su
re
 
To
ta
l n
um
be
r 
N
o 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
da
te
 fo
r 
tr
an
sp
os
iti
on
pa
ss
ed
 p
ri
or
 
To
ta
l 
of
 E
U
 
Pe
nd
in
g 
on
tr
an
sp
os
iti
on
 
m
ea
su
re
 
N
o 
m
ea
su
re
 
to
 d
ir
ec
tiv
e 
or
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
M
em
be
r 
st
at
es
di
re
ct
iv
es
a
1 
N
ov
 2
00
4b
de
ad
lin
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e
re
po
rt
ed
af
te
r 
de
ad
lin
e
co
ns
id
er
ed
A
u
st
ri
a
73
0 
(3
)
18
 (
8)
58
 
78
11
1
17
5
27
9
B
el
g
iu
m
15
99
 (
3)
18
 (
9)
19
0
38
23
2
51
0
59
9
D
en
m
ar
k
16
00
 (
4)
18
 (
9)
19
0
89
21
0
28
7
79
3
Fi
n
la
n
d
73
0 
(1
)
18
 (
8)
58
54
63
10
4
42
4
Fr
an
ce
16
00
 (
3)
18
 (
9)
19
0
12
21
5
47
2
68
1
G
er
m
an
y
15
99
 (
3)
18
 (
9)
18
9
99
27
9
43
5
56
7
G
re
ec
e
16
00
 (
3)
18
 (
9)
19
0
88
21
6
59
0
48
6
Ir
el
an
d
16
00
 (
3)
18
 (
9)
19
0
12
6
22
7
44
6
58
1
It
al
y
16
00
 (
4)
18
 (
9)
19
0
56
19
9
56
9
55
5
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
16
00
 (
0)
18
 (
9)
19
3
19
18
3
62
8
55
0
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
15
99
 (
3)
18
 (
8)
18
9
97
26
8
31
6
70
0
P
o
rt
u
g
al
16
00
 (
1)
18
 (
9)
19
2
24
12
7
70
1
52
8
S
p
ai
n
16
00
 (
2)
18
 (
9)
19
1
75
10
4
47
2
72
9
S
w
ed
en
73
0 
(4
)
18
 (
8)
57
30
97
27
3
24
3
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
16
00
 (
3)
18
 (
9)
19
0
15
5
20
9
34
9
66
7
To
ta
l
21
,3
87
 (
40
)
27
0 
(1
31
)
24
57
10
40
27
40
63
27
83
82
N
ot
es
: T
h
es
e 
d
at
a 
w
er
e 
ex
tr
ac
te
d
 f
ro
m
 C
el
ex
 S
ec
to
r 
7 
(d
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 1
 N
o
ve
m
b
er
 2
00
4)
. F
o
r 
A
u
st
ri
a,
 F
in
la
n
d
 a
n
d
 S
w
ed
en
 t
h
e 
d
at
a 
in
cl
u
d
e 
o
n
ly
 d
ir
ec
ti
ve
s
en
ac
te
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e 
p
er
io
d
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 (
19
95
 –
20
02
).
a
Fi
g
u
re
 in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
in
d
ic
at
es
 t
ra
n
sp
o
si
ti
o
n
 n
o
t 
re
q
u
ir
ed
.
b
Fi
g
u
re
 in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
in
d
ic
at
es
 n
o
 m
at
ch
 in
 C
el
ex
 3
.
the expiry of the deadline. To investigate all ‘regular’ cases, this study
considers only those transposition measures that were reported in the period
between the adoption of the directive and the notification deadline. Upon
closer inspection, this sample comprises 8382 member state transposition
responses (country*directive) passed on time between 1 January 1986 and 
1 February 2003 and having a transposition deadline prior to the date of the
data collection in 1 November 2004.4 Note that only directives passed after the
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden on 1 January 1995 are included in
this sample.
Since neither the inclusion of third parties in ‘fire-alarm oversight’ nor
‘policy patrol oversight’ – where the principals undertake most of the over-
sight themselves – can remedy the parliamentary information deficit, the
question is how often parliaments are involved in the transposition stage, and
how little ex post control parliaments have over their governmental agents.
Figures 2 and 3 refer to the instruments notified by member states within the
prescribed transposition period. For some directives, a member state notified
several instruments, in particular a series of secondary instruments such as
regulations, decrees and circulars. To distinguish between the bureaucratic
nature of this process and the question of whether or not parliaments are
excluded, Figure 2 shows the annual share of parliamentary and non-
parliamentary instruments used to implement directives, while Figure 3
illustrates the extent to which parliament was or was not involved.
Unsurprisingly, some member states, in particular the United Kingdom
and Ireland, exclude their parliaments almost completely from this second
stage and transpose directives wherever possible with non-parliamentary
instruments, such as regulations and statutory instruments. According to
Figure 2, more than 85% of all measures used for the transposition of
directives in the member states are non-parliamentary instruments, and less
than 15% directly involve domestic parliaments. This trend towards bureau-
cratic implementation of directives is visible for almost all member states over
time and across most policy sectors (König et al., 2005). Even in countries that
officially emphasize parliamentary participation, governments more and
more refer to previous legislation as the legal basis for amendments and use
non-parliamentary instruments in the transposition of directives.
Figure 3 shows changes in the annual aggregate statistics of national
parliamentary involvement for individual directives. As with the relative
share of involvement illustrated in Figure 2, we see that parliaments have
little to say in absolute numbers too. Only in Austria, and to a lesser extent
in Denmark, Finland and Germany, do we find parliamentary participation
in almost half of the implementation cases; the average participation rate is
only about 15%. These figures clearly demonstrate that parliamentary ex post
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control hardly exists, revealing a large potential for agency loss, in particular
when the governmental agent is unwilling or unable to serve the parlia-
mentary principal’s interest. Only if the principal were to have complete infor-
mation about the governmental agent’s actions could agency losses be
minimized, but the high degree of parliamentary exclusion prohibits the
acquisition of information on EU law-making. As an extreme example, a
‘liberal’ policy that was contested by the opposition in a national electoral
campaign and rejected by the voters could be implemented by bureaucratic
means without parliamentary knowledge.
Directives: Electoral, governmental and preference change
With regard to the very limited possibilities for parliamentary control, the
identification of potential discontinuity in EU law-making demands empiri-
cal evaluation of the two-stage law-making process, which is an ambitious
task for 15 countries over time. In general, the two-stage nature of this process
implies that the results are determined by two developments: (i) the number
of directives and the number of domestic elections, and (ii) government and
preference change in the member states. A quick inspection of the EU legi-
slative record has already revealed that the number of directives has remained
relatively constant over the past 20 years, whereas the annual number of
regulations dramatically decreased from about 500 at the beginning of the
1990s to well under 100 by the beginning of this century (see Figure 1).
Without considering the qualitative nature of EU legislation, this suggests that
directives – and thus discontinuity in the implementation process – are
becoming relatively more important for the evaluation of EU law-making.
Looking at the number of directives and the number of domestic elec-
tions, 2539 national responses from the total sample of 8382 cases were poten-
tially subject to discontinuity via elections. In Denmark, Austria, Portugal,
Germany and Italy in particular, many cases were subject to elections during
the transposition period. On closer inspection, 2145 cases experienced govern-
mental change, a few without elections owing to a change of coalition partners
during the legislative term. This potential for discontinuity empirically affects
almost 30% of all member state transposition efforts. Table 2 reveals much
variation between the member states: as a result of coalition instability, more
than half of the Italian cases and almost one-third of the Austrian cases were
subject to governmental change, whereas only 4% of British, 10% of Finnish
and 15% of German cases experienced governmental change during the
process. Unsurprisingly, the amount of governmental change is lower than
the number of elections, but every member state experienced governmental
change during the transposition of some directives.
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However, as already mentioned, elections and governmental change are
rather crude indicators of discontinuity. For example, governments might be
re-elected and have similar preferences in the following legislative term, and
this would raise little concern about a potential democratic deficit or lack of
legitimacy. A more important indicator of discontinuity would be a change
in governmental preferences, i.e. the preferences of the previous government
differ from those of the newly elected government that is responsible for the
implementation of the previous government’s activity. Although there is no
indicator for governmental preferences on each directive, I propose using
party manifestos to identify governmental (coalition) preferences across
policy sectors and over time (König, 2007). To control for the possibility that
a previous government might have been outvoted under Council qualified
majority voting and that preference change from the previous to the current
government might even include the preferences of the newly elected govern-
ment in the directive’s policy, Tables 3 and 4 list the number of national
transposition responses related to directives adopted under unanimity in
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Table 2 Member state transposition instruments subject to national elections and
changes in government, 1986–2002
No 
change in Change in
Member state Total No election Election government government
Austria 279 156 123 189 90
Belgium 599 429 170 451 148
Denmark 793 481 312 399 394
Finland 424 371 53 381 43
France 681 488 193 448 233
Germany 567 364 203 484 83
Greece 486 326 160 396 90
Ireland 581 410 171 404 177
Italy 555 359 196 277 278
Luxembourg 550 403 147 493 57
Netherlands 700 553 147 517 183
Portugal 528 320 208 321 207
Spain 729 559 170 641 88
Sweden 243 153 90 198 45
United Kingdom 667 471 196 638 29
Total 8382 5843 2539 6237 2145
Notes: These data were extracted from Celex Sector 7 (downloaded 1 November 2004). For
Austria, Finland and Sweden, the data include only directives enacted during the period of their
membership (1995 –2002).
parentheses. These unanimity cases also demonstrate how difficult a change
of decision would be for the next government if it had different preferences
from the previous government.5
Using party manifestos for the identification of governmental preferences
requires several steps. First, national party manifestos are merged with data
on the party composition of the corresponding governments, including the
date of their inauguration and dismissal. Secondly, in order to relate these
data to policy areas, party positions are computed for specific EU policy
sectors such as agriculture, trade and internal market policies.6 The resulting
European Union Politics 8(3)4 2 6
Table 3 Sector-specific governmental preference change affecting national
transposition measures, 1986–2002
No Minimal Moderate Maximum
change change change change Total
Direction and extent of change across all member states
No change 5860 (1752) 0 0 0 5860 (1752)
Positive change 0 296 (98) 377 (166) 532 (271) 1205 (535)
Negative change 0 336 (82) 460 (177) 521 (251) 1317 (510)
Total 5860 (1752) 632 (180) 837 (343) 1053 (522) 8382 (2797)
Extent of change by member state
Austria 163 (45) 13 (1) 35 (12) 68 (32) 279 (90)
Belgium 417 (118) 68 (13) 85 (54) 29 (16) 599 (201)
Denmark 530 (167) 42 (10) 79 (33) 142 (72) 793 (282)
Finland 339 (86) 27 (9) 5 (3) 53 (32) 424 (130)
France 493 (148) 29 (4) 57 (22) 102 (45) 681 (219)
Germany 369 (108) 79 (19) 47 (22) 72 (42) 567 (191)
Greece 328 (104) 17 (5) 44 (9) 97 (48) 486 (166)
Ireland 419 (105) 35 (9) 47 (26) 80 (33) 581 (173)
Italy 368 (101) 37 (5) 77 (32) 73 (36) 555 (174)
Luxembourg 409 (140) 24 (10) 80 (31) 37 (19) 550 (200)
Netherlands 484 (157) 44 (10) 71 (22) 101 (49) 700 (238)
Portugal 323 (98) 57 (32) 88 (27) 60 (25) 528 (182)
Spain 567 (184) 38 (12) 55 (14) 69 (35) 729 (245)
Sweden 177 (54) 11 (5) 2 (0) 53 (33) 243 (92)
United Kingdom 474 (137) 111 (36) 65 (36) 17 (5) 667 (214)
Total 5860 (1752) 632 (180) 837 (343) 1053 (522) 8382 (2797)
Notes: These data were extracted from Celex Sector 7 (downloaded 1 November 2004). For
Austria, Finland and Sweden, the data include only directives enacted during the period of their
membership (1995–2002). Cases in parentheses indicate application of unanimity voting in
Council as extrapolated from the Celex data.
set of cases was completed with a European integration dimension, referring
to the pro- and anti-European attitude of political parties (Hix, 1999; Gabel
and Hix, 2002; Hooghe et al., 2002; Pennings, 2002). This dimension is coded
for all proposals in addition to the sector-specific dimension, which varies
across all directives to incorporate party preference changes in the respective
area of agriculture, common rules, energy/environment or internal market.
To estimate coalition governmental positions, the positions of the coalition
parties are averaged. Independent from other coding possibilities, the main
advantage is that these positions vary across policy areas and over time. More
specifically, the positions provide information on which sector-specific
outcomes are preferred by governments over time, and the EU dimension
should cover whether a government favours policy-making at the domestic
or the EU level.
Looking at the two-stage process and preference change, the top panel
of Table 3 shows how often and to what extent the sector-specific preferences
of the previous government diverged from those of the government that
transposed the directive. No preference change existed in about two-thirds of
cases, and minimal change (measured as one standard deviation from the
mean) is observable for 632 cases. However, moderate and maximum change7
existed in almost 2000 cases, and this governmental preference change
occurred in both directions. For the unanimity cases (given in parentheses)
maximum change existed for 522 out of the total of 2797, meaning that the
percentage of major changes is even higher under the unanimity rule.
Moreover, we find changes in about 60% of all unanimity cases, which is
notably above the average of about 30% for all cases. Looking more closely
at the sector-specific cases of maximum preference change, the bottom panel
of Table 3 reveals that Austria, Denmark and Sweden most frequently regis-
tered such drastic changes, whereas Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and the UK
experienced fairly minimal changes during most national transpositions.
Finally, Table 4 shows governmental preference change regarding
whether national legislative competences should (in general) be delegated to
the EU level. Compared with Table 3, the number of cases with maximum
change is slightly lower, and moderate preference change exists more often
with respect to EU affairs. Interestingly, we find more maximum and
moderate preference changes in favour of EU integration than against it. This
also holds true for cases under unanimity. Applied to the individual member
states, Austria, France and Sweden are the outliers in terms of maximum
changes, followed by Denmark. Some countries, such as the Netherlands or
Finland, almost lack cases of transposition exposed to maximum governmen-
tal preference change in European affairs.
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Discontinuity and change: Another source of the EU’s
democratic deficit?
Before examining parliamentary deficit and discontinuity of EU law-making
in the member states over a period of more than 15 years, it has been shown
that continuity is a central feature of democratic government in all member
states, in which political authority and power are temporally limited. Voters
assign authority and policy-making power to representatives for a limited
period and, in almost all member states, the authority and policy-making
activities of the representatives formally end with parliamentary dissolution
or the end of legislative terms; thus, pending initiatives usually expire to
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Table 4 Direction and extent of governmental EU preference change affecting
national transposition measures, 1986–2002
No Minimal Moderate Maximum
change change change change Total
Direction and extent of change across all member states
No change 5837 (1748) 0 0 0 5837 (1748)
Positive change 0 216 (86) 502 (210) 506 (228) 1224 (524)
Negative change 0 348 (154) 523 (195) 450 (176) 1321 (525)
Total 5837 (1748) 564 (240) 1025 (405) 956 (404) 8382 (2797)
Extent of change by member state
Austria 163 (45) 0 20 (8) 96 (37) 279 (90)
Belgium 417 (118) 63 (32) 84 (32) 35 (19) 599 (201)
Denmark 530 (167) 0 101 (50) 162 (65) 793 (282)
Finland 339 (86) 45 (25) 36 (17) 4 (2) 424 (130)
France 493 (148) 2 (0) 0 186 (71) 681 (219)
Germany 369 (108) 0 142 (53) 56 (30) 567 (191)
Greece 328 (104) 41 (17) 89 (35) 28 (10) 486 (166)
Ireland 419 (105) 62 (26) 31 (9) 69 (33) 581 (173)
Italy 368 (101) 1 (1) 134 (50) 52 (22) 555 (174)
Luxembourg 409 (140) 0 49 (25) 92 (35) 550 (200)
Netherlands 484 (157) 82 (28) 134 (53) 0 700 (238)
Portugal 323 (98) 128 (55) 57 (20) 20 (9) 528 (182)
Spain 567 (184) 82 (32) 37 (8) 43 (21) 729 (245)
Sweden 154 (50) 0 36 (20) 53 (22) 243 (92)
United Kingdom 474 (137) 58 (24) 75 (25) 60 (28) 667 (214)
Total 5837 (1748) 564 (240) 1025 (405) 956 (404) 8382 (2797)
Notes: These data were extracted from Celex Sector 7 (downloaded 1 November 2004). For
Austria, Finland and Sweden, the data include only directives enacted during the period of their
membership (1995 –2002). Cases in parentheses indicate application of unanimity voting in
Council as extrapolated from the Celex data.
prevent discontinuity between the political mandate and policy-making.
Moreover, the newly elected representatives may more easily change the
decisions of the previous representatives because domestic voting systems are
less restrictive and allow the newly elected majority to initiate, amend and
adopt their programmatic issues. In contrast to the situation in the member
states, the voting system of the EU allows for hardly any policy change and
the two-stage process of EU law-making leads to a high potential for dis-
continuity between the governmental representatives who adopt directives
and those (newly elected) governments that are obliged to implement the
decisions of their predecessors.
With respect to the risk of agency loss, we find that parliamentary control
is almost absent in this two-stage process of adopting and implementing
directives. Except for the Scandinavian countries, the parliaments of the
member states have no ex ante control over their governmental agents and
are rarely included in the ex post transposition stage. This suggests that only
the parliaments of the Scandinavian countries can make attempts to develop
a counter-strategy. The empirical analysis reveals that most countries use
non-parliamentary instruments to transpose directives, even though they
could go through parliament. Parliaments, as the principals, accordingly
have little chance to learn about their agents’ actions, and agency loss is 
very likely in the event of a divergence between the interests of the principal
and those of the agent. This lack of parliamentary control and involvement
threatens to intensify the problems raised by discontinuity because voters
and their representatives lose their right to receive valuable information
about policy-making when their representatives are de facto excluded from
law-making.
The findings from over 15 years of national transposition confirm that
the EU carries this risk of discontinuity. In almost one-third of all cases,
election and governmental change occur during the time-lag between
adoption and transposition. Moreover, in a similar number of cases the pref-
erences between the previous adopting government and the subsequent
implementing government sometimes change drastically, but EU law-making
obliges the successor government to implement policies supported by the
previous government. Because it could be argued that a previous government
has been outvoted under qualified majority voting and perhaps pursued the
‘wrong’ interests of the following majority, this result is controlled for by the
fact that such drastic changes also occur under unanimity rule. In particular
in Austria and Sweden, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, Greece, France
and the Netherlands, the successor government had to implement sector-
specific decisions that were supported by a previous government with very
different preferences. In these countries, public support for European inte-
gration has also decreased in recent years.
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Under these conditions and with respect to the increasingly restrictive
voting system of the EU, as well as the growing importance of directives,
discontinuity seems to pose a considerable problem for the accountability and
legitimacy of EU law-making. On closer inspection of the policy domains, we
find that discontinuity hits the internal market domain particularly hard,
where the most drastic preference changes occur, followed by common rules.
In these domains, there is a large gap between the actors deciding on policies
and those who are forced to bear responsibility in the implementation process.
At the same time, governments prefer to exclude their parliaments and most
frequently use executive instruments to transpose directives. As such, dis-
continuity may not only create another source of the democratic deficit of EU
law-making but also contribute to its increasingly bureaucratic nature.
Notes
I would like to thank Brooke Luetgert for data assistance and helpful comments.
1 According to König (2007), the median time-lag between the proposal and
adoption of EU initiatives has increased and slowed down decision-making
in the last 10 years. In particular, controversial proposals that provide for
unanimous voting in the Council and parliamentary participation signifi-
cantly increase the duration of the legislative process.
2 The 10 new members are excluded from this study because their member-
ship began in May 2004. Thus, their transposition record is too short for a
meaningful empirical examination.
3 The appendix is available at www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm.
4 Because the average transposition period is two years, the tables and graphs
refer to directives passed between 1986 and 2002. The directives from late
2002 and early 2003 were largely pending at the time of data collection.
5 Studies on the Council’s voting record report a significant trend towards
consensus decision-making among member states and dispute the effective
application of qualified majority voting (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Mattila, 2004;
Heisenberg, 2005).
6 In order to avoid missing data, the manifesto calculation procedure is applied.
This a mix of policy positions and weights (see Laver, 2001).
7 The categories describing the amount of governmental preference change
refer to the first and second standard deviations around the absolute value
of mean sector-specific and mean EU preference change.
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